羅伯特·威爾遜
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羅伯特·威爾遜 (Robert Wilson，1937年-)：產業組織理論早期代表人物之一,拍賣與競標機制設計的權威學者
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羅伯特•威爾遜1963年獲得哈佛大學商業管理博士學位。。威爾遜曾當選為美國科學院院士（1994）和世界計量經濟學會主席（1999）。現任斯坦福大學商學院教授。2020年諾貝爾經濟學獎獲得者。
其研究與教學涉及市場設計、定價、談判、及有關產業組織與信息經濟學的相關主題。他是一個博弈論專家。作為產業組織理論早期代表人物之一，他在價格理論、市場設計等領域作出了突出貢獻。
從1970年代起，威爾遜從事博弈論研究，並作出了重要貢獻，尤其是他和克萊珀斯（Kreps）一起提出的序貫均衡概念（Kreps＆Wilson1982），是對不完全信息動態博弈的解的概念的重要突破。
從1980年代起，威爾遜對於拍賣機制設計的理論與應用的研究取得重要成果，成為電信、交通和能源等領域的拍賣與競標機制設計的權威學者。1993年，威爾遜的價格機制研究的集大成之作《非線性定價》由牛津大學出版社出版，該書對費率設計和電信、交通和能源等公用事業相關主題進行了百科全書式的分析，該權威著作為他贏得了很高榮譽。
瑞典皇家科學院宣佈：R.威爾遜和彭齊亞斯1964年的發現“已經使人們有可能獲得很久以前宇宙誕生時所發生的宇宙過程的信息”。貝爾實驗室的這兩位射電天文學家原打算利用喇叭形天線和激光掃描儀來精確測量包圍著我們的銀河系的氣暈所發射的無線電流。當調準他們的裝置時，他們發現了一些更重要的東西——災變火球或大爆炸的微弱的回波。大約在150～200億年以前，正是在這種大爆炸中產生了化學元素。
在1929年天文學上一個較早期的重大發現中，哈勃（Hubble）研究了遙遠星系所發出的光的紅移，他發現紅移量與距離成正比。按照多普勒原理，這意味著星系越遠，它離開地球的運動越快。這一結果使得理論家們，特別是G.伽莫夫提出，宇宙是從一次大爆炸開始的。在大爆炸中，高溫高壓火球變成現在如此廣泛瀰漫於空間的物質。隨著輻射膨脹，它的溫度在經過一段時期（按照哈勃關係計算約為180億年）後從300K降到3K。威爾遜和彭齊亞斯的測量證實了這種背景輻射的存在。因此支持了大爆炸理論。
威爾遜於1936年生於得克薩斯州的休斯敦。作為賴斯大學的學生，由於少年時期對電子學的愛好，他起初攻讀電機工程學，後來改讀物理學。1962年，他以射電天文學方面的論文獲得加州理工學院的哲學博士學位。次年，他成為射電天文學研究員。現在，他是貝爾電話實驗室無線電物理部的主任。該部有14個人，他們除了從事射電天文學的研究外還從事微波固體器件、集成電路方面的研究。威爾遜特別對通過毫米波測量星際分子來研究銀河系中的暗雲感興趣。威爾遜太太貝特西（Betsy）說過，她對他的工作很理解，因為她的父親也是一個科學家。威爾遜夫婦有三個孩子。
Robert Wilson is the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, at the Stanford Business School, where he has been on the faculty since 1964. His research and teaching are on market design, pricing, negotiation, and related topics concerning industrial organization and information economics. He is an expert on game theory and its applications.
Dr. Wilson has been a major contributor to auction designs and competitive bidding strategies in the oil, communication, and power industries, and to the design of innovative pricing schemes. His work on pricing of priority service for electric power has been implemented in the utility industry. His book on Nonlinear Pricing (Oxford Press, 1993) is an encyclopedic analysis of tariff design and related topics for public utilities, including power, communications, and transport; it won the 1995 Leo Melamed Prize, awarded biannually by the University of Chicago for “outstanding scholarship by a business professor.” His work on game theory includes wage bargaining and strikes, and in legal contexts, settlement negotiations. He has authored some of the basic studies of reputational effects in predatory pricing, price wars, and other competitive battles.
He has published approximately a hundred articles in professional journals and books since completing the Bachelor, Master, and Doctoral degrees at Harvard College and the Harvard Business School. He has been an associate editor of several journals, and delivered several public lectures. He is an elected member of the National Academy of Sciences, a designated distinguished fellow of the American Economic Association, and a fellow, former officer and Council member of the Econometric Society. The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration conferred an honorary Doctor of Economics degree in 1986, and the University of Chicago, an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1995.
On problems of pricing strategy, he has advised the U.S. Department of the Interior and oil companies (on bidding for offshore leases), the Electric Power Research Institute (on pricing of electric power, design of priority service systems, design of wholesale markets, funding of basic research, and risk analysis of environmental hazards and climate change), and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (on pricing product lines in high technology industries). With Paul Milgrom he designed for Pacific Bell the auction of spectrum licenses adopted by the FCC, and subsequently worked on the bidding strategy team, and later for other firms. He contributed to the designs of the power exchange and auctions of ancillary services in California, and he has continued to advise EPRI, the California Power Exchange, the California, New England, and Ontario System Operators, the Canadian Competition Bureau, Energy Ministries of several countries, and others involved in the design of auctions for electricity, power and gas transmission, and telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere. His designs of other auctions have been adopted by private firms. He has been an expert witness on antitrust and securities matters.
- "Information, Efficiency and the Core of an Economy", 1978, Econometrica
- "Reputation and Imperfect Information", with D.M. Kreps, 1982, JET
- "Sequential Equilibria", with D.M. Kreps, 1982, Econometrica
- "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", with D.M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, 1982, JET
- "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions", 1985, Econometrica
