阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦

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阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦（Ariel Rubinstein）

　　阿里尔·鲁宾斯坦（Ariel Rubinstein，1951年4月13日-），特拉维夫大学和纽约大学经济学教授，国际上最受尊重的经济学家之一，在经济学的许多领域均有巨大贡献，尤以博弈论、有限理性研究最为出色。他的作品风格极具原创性，且惊人地简约。

　　他已出版的著作有：

• 《讨价还价与市场》（1990，与 Martion Osborne合著），

• 《博弈论教程》（1994，与Martin Osborne合著），
• 《经济学寓言》（2012），
• 《有限理性建模》（1998），
• 《经济学与语言》（2000）等。

本条目包含过多不是中文的内容，欢迎协助翻译。 若已有相当内容译为中文，可迳自去除本模板。

• 1974: B.Sc. Mathematics, Economics and Statistics

• 1975: M.A. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)

• 1976: M.Sc Mathematics (supervisor: Bezalel Peleg)

• 1979: Ph.D. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)

• Fellow of The Econometric Society: 1985 (executive committee 1994-7)

• Foreign honorary member of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1994

• Foreign honorary member of The American Economic Association: 1995

• Fellow of The Israeli Academy of Sciences: 1995

• The Michael Bruno memorial award: 2000

• Pras Israel: 2002

• Doctor Honorees Causa of Tilburg University: 2002

• Honorary Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford: 2002

• President of The Econometric Society: 2004 (presidential report)

• Member, European Academy of Sciences and Arts: 2004

• Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University: 2004

• Fellow, European Economic Association: 2004

• The EMET Prize: 2006

• Elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy: 2007

　　计量经济学会院士：1985年（执行委员会1994-7）

　　外国名誉会员，美国艺术与科学学院：1994年

　　外交部美国经济协会的名誉会员：1995

　　以色列科学研究院研究员：1995年

　　迈克尔布鲁诺纪念奖：2000

　　以色列：2002年有害生物风险分析

　　蒂尔堡大学博士获奖原因：2002年

　　荣誉院士，牛津大学纳菲尔德学院：2002年

　　计量经济学会主席：2004年（总统报告）

　　会员，欧洲科学院和艺术：2004年

　　Nemmers奖，美国西北大学：2004年

　　研究员，欧洲经济协会：2004年

　　EMET奖：2006年

　　当选英国科学院通讯院士：2007年

• 1. Bargaining and Markets, with M.Osborne, Academic Press 1990

• 2. A Course in Game Theory, with M.Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.
  • Chinese translation, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000.

• 3. Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
  • Chinese translation, China Renmin Univerity, 2004.
  • Japanese translation, Kyoritsu Shuppan, 2008.

• 4. Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
  • Chapter 5 was translated to French and published in Critique Economique N°10.Printemps été, 2003 pdf
  • Chinese translation, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2004.

• 5. Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic agent), Princeton Univeristy Press, 2005.
  • Chinese translation, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007.

• 1. A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. pdf jstor

• 2. False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf html

• 3. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf

• 4. An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf

• 5. A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economic Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf science direct

• 6. Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics 38 (1980), 108-111. pdf jstor

• 7. Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf

• 8. Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. pdf

• 9. On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economic Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf science direct

• 10. A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. pdf

• 11. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. pdf jstor

• 12. Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694. pdf jstor

• 13. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari, Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf

• 14. The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf

• 15. Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. pdf

• 16. The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730. pdf jstor

• 17. Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. pdf

• 18. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. pdf jstor

• 19. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. pdf jstor (see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2004))

• 20. Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. pdf

• 21. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf

• 22. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888. pdf jstor

• 23. Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. pdf

• 24. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188. pdf jstor

• 25. A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. pdf

• 26. Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. pdf jstor

• 27. The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. pdf

• 28. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf

• 29. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. pdf jstor (see also Abreu-Rubinstein (1993))

• 30. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf

• 31. Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24. pdf jstor

• 32. The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391. pdf jstor

• 33. Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. pdf

• 34. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. pdf jstor

• 35. On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. pdf

• 36. New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. pdf

• 37. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. pdf jstor

• 38. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614.jstor

• 39. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. pdf jstor

• 40. Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. pdf

• 41. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484. pdf jstor

• 42. A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf

• 43. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. pdf science direct

• 44. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf science direct

• 45. Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. pdf original discussion paper(1977)

• 46. Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf science direct

• 47. John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(1995), 9-13. pdf

• 48. On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. pdf

• 49. Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. pdf jstor

• 50. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. pdf science direct

• 51. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games, with A.Tversky and D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf (eopisode in NUMB3RS)

• 52. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441. pdf science direct

• 53. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24. pdf science direct

• 54. The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.pdf science direct

• 55. On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160 (1997), 385-395. pdf

• 56. Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847. pdf jstor

• 57. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173. pdf science direct

• 58. Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf science direct

• 59. Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with L. Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf science direct

• 60. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170. science direct ( Better see an extended "Second Edition" )

• 61. A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001), 615-628. pdf science direct

• 62. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with J.Glazer Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173. pdf science direct

• 63. Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. pdf science direct

• 64. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Mutltiple Rationales, with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70 (2002), 2481-2488. pdf

• 65. Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235- 243. pdf

• 66. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf

• 67. "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf html

• 68. Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Theory, 45 (2003), 434-441. pdf

• 69. The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory ,117 (2004), 119-123. pdf science direct

• 70. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf

• 71. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debates: An Expository Note, with Jacob Glazer, in Game Theory and Pragmatics, Ed. by Anton Benz, Gerhard Jaeger, and Robert van Rooij. 2005, 251-265. Palgrave MacMillan. pdf

• 72. A Model of Choice from Lists, with Yuval Salant, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 3-17. pdf (see 2Xyuval)

• 73. A Skeptic Comment on the Studies of Economics, Economic Journal, 116 (2006), C1-C9. pdf html

• 74. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883. pdf

• (Spanish tarnslation: Revista De Economia Institucional, 8 (2006), 191-213)

• 75. A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Kobi Glazer, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410. pdf

• (Reprinted in New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, K.EApt and R.van Rooij (eds.) Amsterdam Univeristy Press, 2008).

• 76. Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Adavnces in Economic Theory (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R. Blundell, W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2006, vol II, 246-254. pdf or pdf

• 77. Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896. pdf (the paper won the 2007 RES prize)

• 78. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 1243-1259. pdf

• 79. Luxury Prices: An Expository Note, with Michele Piccione, Japanese Economic Review, 59 (2008), 127-132. pdf

• 80. Money Pumps in the Market, with Rani Spiegler. Journal of European Economics Review, 6 (2008), 237–253. pdf

• 81. Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference, with Yuval Slalant, in The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Eds. A.Caplin and A.Schotter, 2008, 115-124, New York: Oxford Univeristy Press. pdf

• 82. Comments on NeuroEconomics. Economics and Philosophy, 24 (2008), 485-494.pdf

• 83. (A,f), Choice with Frames, with Yuval Slalant. Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 1287-1296. pdf