恆美廣告公司

出自 MBA智库百科(http://wiki.mbalib.com/)

恒美广告公司(Doyle Dane Bernbach,简称DDB)LOGO标志

恆美廣告公司(Doyle Dane Bernbach,簡稱DDB)——Omnicom集團下屬子公司

恆美廣告公司官方網站網址:http://www.ddb.com/

目錄

恆美廣告公司(DDB)簡介

     恆美DDB公司(DDB Needham Worldwide)於1949年成立於美國紐約,是一傢具有五十多年曆史的世界頂極4A廣告公司。恆美DDB的全稱為 Doyle Dane Bernbach。是傳播公司Omnicom集團的子公司。在96個國家裡,設有206 個分公司/辦事處。1949年,威廉·伯恩巴克道爾(N.Doyle)及戴恩(M.Dane)共同創辦DDB廣告公司(Doyle Dane Bernbach,即恆美廣告公司)DDB廣告公司是著名的世界十大廣告公司之一。全球的營業額是180億美金。

恆美DDB中國

  北京新世紀恆美廣告有限公司( DDB BJ )是由北京新世紀廣告有限公司與美國恆信傳媒集團( DDB Worldwide Communications Group Inc. ) 2001 年重組成立的合資廣告公司,憑籍對本土市場的深度理解以及國際化的運作經驗,為國際國內眾多客戶提供全面的廣告服務,在上海、廣州設有分公司和辦事處。

DDB公司的ROI品牌工具

恒美广告公司标志

   一項成功的廣告運動,取決於兩個方面的決定因素。

  一是創意靈感,它讓30秒的TVC或平面廣告充滿形象﹑文案及音樂。我們並未設定許多規則去教你如何得到它,我們也不希望如此。

  另外一個就是創意過程之前的企劃,也就是設定廣告之前的方向:廣告要傳達什麼才具說服力? 要跟哪一類消費者說話?要說什麼才能鼓勵他們採取行動?何時﹑何地﹑如何說才是跟他們溝通的最佳方式? 回答這些問題是決定廣告策略的過程。

  一個好的策略在於它能洞悉真實世界里的人﹑情感﹑信念﹑成見﹑競爭者,以及目標消費者通常在什麼情況下購買﹑使用產品,競爭者的廣告又如何等等。真正去瞭解這些,才能發展出好的策略。如果一開始我們就沒有確實的瞭解何時﹑何地﹑如何說以及為什麼傳播可以造成差異性,即使是世界上最棒的創意,也不會產生效力。   所以百年公司一直認同:策略第一,創意第二。

  下麵所說的這些東西,它可以幫你在廣告前掌舵正確的策略航向,我稱它為ROI。R 是指(Relevance)相關性,O是指(Originality)原創性,I是指(Impact)衝擊性,藉由這套工具,幫你創造最好的﹑最有效的廣告,併為客戶創造投資上的回收(Return On Investment)。 這套品牌策略工具由以下幾大部分構築而成:

  • 廣告要達成什麼目的?
  • 要對誰說話?
  • 期望他們做什麼?
  • 在何時﹑何地跟他們說話?
  • 提供什麼利益促使他們採取行動?
  • 要為品牌建立什麼樣的個性?
  • 什麼Insight是本廣告活動的焦點?

  ROI過程的結果應該是一個很清楚﹑很有連貫性的傳播策略陳述。它能讓創意文稿及媒體計劃有更清楚的方向。 一個好的策略可以節省許多時間﹑爭議﹑精力, 更重要的是它能讓傳播更加有效。 下麵就將這套工具拆開詳細的一一闡述,運用這套策略可以理清品牌思考方向,撰寫提案本的企劃書。

ROI是怎麼來的?

  ROI是一種速記法,簡述客戶需要的是什麼,及廣告如何解決客戶的需要。以Relevance相關性﹑Originality原創性﹑Impact衝擊性為原則來創作廣告傳播,為客戶帶來投資上的回報(Return On Investment)。

  威廉·伯恩巴克的名言及經驗證明瞭廣告確實需要Relevance相關性﹑Originality創意﹑Impact衝擊性。

一份ROI在什麼時候才算完成?

  企劃是為了贏得策略,一旦策略被同意了,就必須確實地遵守,別讓它失去焦點。有時候會發生這樣的狀況,當大家都已同意了一個策略,然後創意團隊又提出另外一個錶面上更好﹑新的點子----但這個點子並不符合該策略。這讓大家陷入了進退兩難: 要錯失這個點子?或要捨棄策略?這裡有第三種方法: 看看我們是否可以再發展出一個新的﹑更好的策略來契合這個新點子.而這個策略當然必須以我們對消費者﹑競爭者等的深入瞭解為基礎而使其更完美。

  如果可行, 那再好不過了,我們擁有比以前更好的﹑更有機會勝出的策略(這樣做並沒有錯,創意過程讓我們張開眼睛看到了一個精益求精的做法。)。如果不可行,我們就必須下結論, 不管我們有多喜歡這個創意點子,但對目前的情況而言,它並不是一個正確的點子,但也許可以用在其它地方。

  所以,直到一個策略已被使用來發展有效的廣告創意之前,都是還未完成的。

ROI跟其它任何的策略系統有什麼不一樣?

  大部份的策略系統的某些元素是相同的,所有的策略系統都有不盡相同之處。ROI里問的問題及回答問題的角度,是較其它最不同的地方.

  其它系統一開始並不是以行銷目標起頭的。ROI堅持在這個過程一開始即明確清楚地陳述我們希望達成的行銷目標,更重要的是清楚的指定我們希望何時達成目標。 ROI要求我們在開始旅程之前,先確認目的地是那裡。

  其它系統沒有指定“我們預期消費者在看過﹑聽過廣告後會採取什麼行動”。ROI要求我們描述我們所期望的行為改變,我們期望消費者要採取的行動及取代了什麼行動。如果我們對所尋找的行為改變一清二楚,促使他們改變行為的機會也就更大.

  其它策略系統視媒體為一種事後的工作。ROI則要求我們把「目標對象的媒體管道」擺在最前面——何時﹑何地及在什麼情況下目標對象對我們的建議是最能接受的。在ROI裡頭,媒體是整個過程的中心。  

  其它策略系統沒有要求像我們所設定的主要獨到見解。 ROI要求我們去檢查策略中所有的獨到見解,然後挑出最重要的一個。ROI要求我們把主要獨到見解明示出來,讓大家都能看到,因為它就是發展創意的起點.

  使用ROI過程來回答問題,在其它策略系統裡頭,策略可以由個人獨自發展而成。ROI策略是一種團隊行動,是由客戶及廣告公司雙方受過專業訓練的選手來做的。我們可以把團隊中的任何一人的點子激發出來,並將它推上最高境界。

ROI策略要如何產生?

  ROI設定了一系列的問題,透過這過程仔細地過濾並彈性地回答這些問題。一般而言,回答ROI里的問題最好的方式是把它當做是一個工作會議的主軸,其中包括業務﹑媒體﹑創意人員及客戶。如此可以讓參予其事的每一個人貢獻出他的專業觀點,並凝聚大家的共識。

  總之,如果要召開ROI團隊會議的時機不能配合,你還是可以使用ROI——也應該要使用。甚至兩個人也可以針對問題討論半個鐘頭,或利用午餐時討論,都可以討論出意想不到的點子。任何一個點子都不能把它看做是很不重要而不值得列入策略思考。

我能自己做ROI嗎?

  自己做勝於不做,如此可以訓練你進入ROI的思考模式。但跟其他人一起來做大部份的工作,更能改善創意點子的品質,並能幫助團隊其他成員達成更一致的共識.

ROI的用處更勝於廣告嗎?

  ROI適用於任何一種說服的廣告傳播,不只局限於行銷領域里而已。它的好用之處不勝枚舉,你可以用它來寫一封信,或企劃一場演示文稿或演說,甚至跟你的銀行經理貸款。事實上,每天都使用它可以助你很自然地習慣去使用它.

恆美廣告公司(DDB)主要客戶

DDB Needham Worldwide History(DDB廣告公司歷史)

DDB Needham Worldwide is one of the largest advertising firms in the world, with 183 offices representing over 1,200 clients in 75 countries. It was formed in 1986 through the merger of Doyle Dane Bernbach and Needham Harper Worldwide.

Doyle Dane Bernbach was founded in New York City in 1949 by Ned Doyle, Maxwell Dane, and William Bernbach, who acted as president. Bernbach and Doyle had worked together at Grey Advertising during the mid-1940s; Dane had been running his own small advertising firm. DDB initially had 13 employees and $500,000 in billings. Its first ads were done for Ohrbach's department store and appeared in New York daily newspapers. Initially, most of the company's clients used small budgets to promote little-known products, but it became one of the most influential firms in advertising history.

DDB quickly became known for stylish advertisements that relied on catchy slogans and witty humor rather than the repetition and hard sell used by many competing firms; its "soft-sell" approach stood out. By 1954 the firm had grown sufficiently to expand to the West Coast by taking over Factor-Breyer, a Los Angeles agency. Gradually it built spin-off DDB/West around it.

In 1960 the agency won the account of Avis, then the number-two auto rental company. Bernbach penned the slogan, "We Try Harder Because We're Number 2." In 1961 DDB opened its first international office in West Germany, where an important client, Volkswagen, was based. One of the firm's more memorable slogans, done for Volkswagen, was "Think Small," and featured a tiny photograph of a Volkswagen Beetle surrounded by blank space. Ads like this were widely imitated, bringing the firm international acclaim and new clients. In 1966 the firm signed Mobil Oil, a major client for the next two decades with advertising budgets in the tens of millions of dollars.

Meanwhile, the firm continued to build its overseas network. Its London office was particularly strong and employed leading creative talents during the 1970s. In 1968 the firm named Bernbach chairman and chief executive officer; in 1976 it named him chairman of the executive committee. Under his leadership DDB often ignored rules followed by other agencies, relying on instinct and brainstorming sessions rather than research and marketing plans. It also tried to keep creative personnel separated from business pressures that account executives and clients fretted over. This philosophy won and kept many of the most creative people in advertising as employees.

However, this successful formula collapsed after Bernbach's death in 1982. Some personnel became arrogant and difficult to manage; many clients left, as did some high-profile talent. The firm's earnings fell to $7.6 million that year, a 30 percent decline from the year before. By 1986--despite worldwide billings of about $1.67 billion, 3,400 employees, and 54 offices in 19 countries--some industry observers thought the firm was in serious trouble.

Needham Harper Worldwide started in Chicago in 1925 as Maurice H. Needham Co. It had two clients, with billings totaling $270,000. Billings reached $500,000 in 1928, and the following year the firm reorganized as Needham, Louis and Brorby, Inc. Billings reached $1 million in 1934, the same year the agency signed Kraft Foods. Hollywood was becoming the center of the production of network radio programs, and NL&B opened a Hollywood office to produce clients' programs, which included "Fibber McGee and Molly," and "The Great Gildersleeve."

In 1951 the agency opened a New York office to concentrate on the rapidly expanding television industry. To strengthen its still weak New York base, the firm merged with Doherty, Clifford, Steers and Shenfield in 1965 and changed its name to Needham, Harper & Steers. In the meantime, the much stronger Chicago office was adding clients like the Morton Company, Household Finance Corporation, and General Mills. In 1966 NH&S won the Continental Airlines account and opened a Los Angeles office to handle it. The firm soon added Frigidaire to its client list.

In 1972 the agency opened an office in Washington, D.C. It initially handled advertising from local McDonald's owner/operator co-ops, but soon it was winning government, media, and local retail clients. The firm was successful in the late 1970s, and in 1978 it was named Advertising Agency of the Year by Advertising Age. In 1980 NH&S started an Issues & Images division to concentrate on corporate, government, and association advertising.

Keith L. Reinhard, who had headed the agency's Chicago office, became president in 1982 and made improving the New York office one of his primary goals. Despite some successes, the firm was struggling in New York. The jingle-based advertisements that had won clients like McDonald's in the Midwest were not working well in the New York market. In June 1982 the firm restructured, citing the preparation for future growth. NH&S became the holding company for three smaller companies: Needham, Harper & Steers/USA, Inc., had offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dayton, Ohio; Needham, Harper & Steers International, Inc., became responsible for all NH&S operations outside of the United States, operating in 32 world markets; NH&S/Issues & Images, Inc., became a separate corporation including NH&S/Washington and the public relations firm of Porter, Novelli & Associates, which had offices in Washington and Los Angeles.

In 1984 NH&S bought the DR Group, Inc., a large direct-response advertising company with offices in New York, Boston, and London. Because of client conflict problems, in May 1984 the New York office of NH&S/Issues & Images became a separate, unaffiliated company called Biederman & Company. The Washington office of Issues & Images became a division of NH&S/USA. The public relations arm of Issues & Images was renamed Needham Porter Novelli. Soon after, the agency ended its holding company experiment and consolidated back to one company, now called Needham Harper Worldwide, Inc.

The company expanded its California presence in 1985 with the purchase of Lane & Huff Advertising, based in San Diego; Needham Porter Novelli bought the Public Relations Board, Inc., of Chicago. As it approached its merger with Doyle Dane Bernbach, Needham Harper had its headquarters in New York, with major offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington and secondary offices in Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, and Baltimore.

During the mid-1980s many public companies were snatched up in hostile takeovers, and public advertising firms, including the weakened Doyle Dane Bernbach, worried about their futures. Though their positions were stronger, Needham Harper and another large firm, BBDO, also worried about being taken over. Led by Needham head Keith Reinhard and BBDO president Allen Rosenshine, in 1986 the three firms--DDB, Needham Harper, and BBDO--agreed to merge into the Omnicom Group, which would act as a holding company. BBDO remained a separate company, but DDB and Needham Harper merged further into a new company called DDB Needham Worldwide. Needham Harper had been weak in New York and Europe, precisely where DDB was strong, and DDB had wanted to strengthen its Midwest operations. Together the two companies boasted clients like General Mills, Amtrack, GTE Telcom, Volkswagen, and Chivas Regal Scotch, with billings of $2 billion. Strategically the merger made sense, but getting employees and their different styles to mesh proved difficult.

That task was spearheaded by Reinhard, who became president of the new firm. He soon found that the DDB New Yorkers resented the merger and considered him a country bumpkin, since he had grown up in Indiana and worked in Chicago. Morale was low in New York because of the years of decline following Bernbach's death; it fell further as a result of layoffs. The staff of the former DDB was cut to 700 from 1,100. Both firms had London offices, which heard of the merger via facsimile, and each office started telling newspapers it would head the combined agency. Reinhard made six trips to London, fired most of the Needham managers, and put DDB managers in charge. Critics charged that the merger had no creative vision, and the New York office signed no new clients; many employees started to leave for other agencies.

Problems also arose because of competing accounts held by Needham and DDB. For example, because of DDB's historic ties to Volkswagen, Needham's Los Angeles office, which had the $100 million Honda Motor account, was spun off as Rubin Postaer & Associates; the $32 million RJR Nabisco account, which had been DDB's, was let go because of Needham's General Mills account.

After a period of introspection, which included reading William Bernbach's writings about advertising, Reinhard decided the new firm should be a creative leader but for larger clients, leaving truly adventurous advertising to smaller competitors. He started using teams for each client project, including employees from media buying and account planning in addition to the usual creative staff and market researchers. The teams were to stress relevancy, originality, and impact. Many industry observers felt that incorporating media planning into the creative process was an important innovation, and the firm became known for it.

In the fall of 1987, with a creative direction chosen, Reinhard replaced executive creative director John Noble, who had been a divisive advocate of DDB methods, with the team of Jack Mariucci and Robert Mackall. They managed the firm's 105-person creative department. Copywriters and art directors were not assigned to specific clients but rather were used by the department's six creative directors as needed. The staff learned to work together and the firm's talent flight stopped. It began to win important new accounts like the $42 million campaign for Sears's Discover credit card. The firm grossed $358.5 million in 1987 on billings of $2.6 billion.

In 1988 the firm continued to win new accounts, like the $18.5 million contract to create advertisements for the New York State Lottery and a $25--30 million account for a global campaign for Seagram's Martell cognac. It also won a Clio award for a print ad created for Colombian coffee. As with any ad agency, it also lost accounts such as the $20 million Hasbro account. But the firm was now rolling, and it was the leading U.S. advertising agency in 1989 in terms of newspaper media billings.

In a move that raised eyebrows throughout the advertising industry and beyond, DDB Needham offered in 1990 to guarantee the results of its advertising, making its compensation for an ad campaign partly related to the client meeting its sales goals. For three years the firm had been test marketing parts of the program, which called for a bonus of up to 33 percent or a discount of up to 30 percent on firm charges. Advocates claimed the plan would result in more accountability and many clients liked it; critics pointed out the difficulty of scientifically proving the effect of advertising on sales. In any event, few clients signed up.

Meantime, the U.S. economy and the economies of many of its trading partners were in recession, leading to a drop in advertising billings. Accordingly, the firm lost the accounts of some important clients like Clorox, Campbell's Soup, and Maybelline. Still, the firm scored some victories. It won the $40 million Reebok shoe account and the $12.5 million Canon 35-mm camera account. Nevertheless, the early 1990s proved to be a difficult time for the firm: it laid off 29 of 700 employees at its New York office in mid-1991, 45 more in mid-1992. In 1993 it dropped from being the third-largest agency in the United States to sixth-largest, with revenues declining to $229 million on sales of $1.9 billion.

In May 1992 the firm brought in Andy Berlin as president of the New York office. Berlin had been CEO of Goodby, Berlin & Silverstein, a San Francisco agency, which he left because the firm would not grow fast enough for his ambitions.

At the beginning of 1993 DDB Needham announced that it would no longer take, at least temporarily, any new business. Already possessing a good-sized roster of longtime clients, the firm felt it best to make certain their needs were met rather than seek new business--and thereby risk alienating favored customers who could feel slighted. One reason for this move was the rumblings of dissatisfaction from Volkswagen. Berlin personally took over supervision of the U.S. portion of the account, which had $50 million in billings (the account had been supervised by DDB's Troy, Michigan, office). Even with the extra attention, however, in March 1993 Volkswagen put its $100 million German account up for review.

At the same time, the firm moved forward with a plan to centralize its media buying. In September 1992 DDB combined about $200 million worth of national television buying from the Chicago and New York offices. It opened a branch called USA Media, which bought airtime for all of Needham's U.S. offices.

Tensions persisted. The Chicago office, which long had a base of packaged goods manufacturers that preferred conservative advertising, was luring high-profile executives from other firms to begin flashier, higher-profile ad campaigns that might win awards and new clients. But the effort was lagging by mid-1993, and billings in the Chicago office had actually been declining slightly for the past several years. The office lost the $20 million Audi account and the $25 million American Dairy Association account, and the creative talent that had come up with cutting-edge ads for gym shoes had a harder time selling boxes of cereal.

DDB Needham restructured the office, but laying off 14 percent of the workforce there badly hurt morale. Other advertising agencies were going through similar problems, but DDB Needham's management kept on the Chicago office--still its largest and most profitable. Starting around the beginning of 1994 things came together for the Chicago office, and it won new clients including Helene Curtis, S. C. Johnson, and Budweiser. Billings grew to $670 million, up about $75 million from 1993. The advertising industry in general was recovering from the lean years of the early 1990s, and DDB Needham's clients in package goods, health care, and telecommunications were buying more advertising. At the end of 1994 DDB Needham won an important new account when Sony Europe chose it for a $120 million ad campaign.

本條目對我有幫助45
分享到:
  如果您認為本條目還有待完善,需要補充新內容或修改錯誤內容,請編輯條目

評論(共9條)

提示:評論內容為網友針對條目"恆美廣告公司"展開的討論,與本站觀點立場無關。
218.19.206.* 在 2009年12月27日 17:04 發表

利害!

回複評論
114.92.68.* 在 2010年1月7日 14:06 發表

汗。。。

回複評論
112.193.100.* 在 2011年6月29日 14:43 發表

說的好,

回複評論
123.172.111.* 在 2012年5月3日 14:08 發表

請問:恆美廣告公司的民間融資程式

回複評論
180.175.46.* 在 2013年5月21日 01:13 發表

他們公司其實挺事兒媽的

回複評論
180.157.27.* 在 2013年7月18日 15:03 發表

個個心機重,可怕的很!當面一套背後一套!裡面的人都很凶,高傲的很。直接把人罵死,活人都會被罵死!作品都不知道在寫什麼。客戶面前面後都是兩張臉的。你進去就慘了!

回複評論
180.157.27.* 在 2013年7月18日 15:05 發表

218.19.206.* 在 2009年12月27日 17:04 發表

利害!

都是吹出來的。

回複評論
180.157.27.* 在 2013年7月18日 15:13 發表

這家公司里的人都是心機重,凶悍的!客戶面前面後都是不一樣的。進去的人小心啊,不要哭著累著出來。

回複評論
204.152.207.* 在 2014年1月21日 00:19 發表

180.157.27.* 在 2013年7月18日 15:13 發表

這家公司里的人都是心機重,凶悍的!客戶面前面後都是不一樣的。進去的人小心啊,不要哭著累著出來。

真的嗎。。。。。。。。怎麼生存

回複評論

發表評論請文明上網,理性發言並遵守有關規定。